Berlin (EAST SEA) Sunday, June 25th, 2017 / 03:24 PM

Russia’s power calculation in the South China Sea

25/6/2017

Russia and Vietnam have upgraded their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partner. Vietnam-Russia are developing a joint project on oil and gas in the South China Sea and Moscow also wishes to return to Cam Ranh Bay and sell advanced weapons to help Vietnam improve its defense capabilities. An evaluation of Oilprice Magazine.

In “Putin’s Plan in the South China Sea,” Oilprice analyzes Russia’s East Sea policy.

First of all, Oilprice notes that Russia’s policy on the South China Sea dispute is more complex than it appears. On the official level, Moscow is an external agent, not a party involved in the dispute. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow has “never been involved in a dispute in the South China Sea”, and the Russian principle is “not to stand on one side of the dispute”.

However, according to Oilprice, behind the formal appearance of not engaging itself, Russia still strengthens its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and negotiates billions of dollars of arms and oil with many parties. These points out that, despite not having direct disputes in the South China Sea, Moscow still has strategic objectives, rights and actions that have a direct bearing on the situation in the South China Sea.

A quarter of the Russian military modernization program up to 2020 is devoted to the Pacific Fleet, headquartered in Vladivostok, Russia’s Far East, for better equipment used in operations in far waters.

According to Oilprice, Russian-Chinese military cooperation has come to the level in which Putin has seen China as natural partner and natural ally. The joint naval junction between the two countries – Joint Sea 2016 – also took place in the South China Sea, and was the first such exercise between China and a second country in the South China Sea after the decision of the International Court in The Hague on the claim of Beijing’s so-called “nine dash line” in the South China Sea.

(Chinese naval exercises to occupy the island with the Russians in the South China Sea in September 2016)

Oilprice noted that relations between Russia and Vietnam are also on the same trend: Russia and Vietnam have upgraded relations to “comprehensive strategic partners”. Vietnam and Russia are developing a joint oil and gas project in the South China Sea and Moscow is also expressing its desire to return to Cam Ranh base while selling advanced weapons to Vietnam to help Vietnam improve its military capabilities.

According to Oilprice, Moscow’s current behavior does not seem to be very similar to the official statements. The simultaneous strengthening of cooperation with both Beijing and Hanoi makes Russia’s intentions more difficult to understand, and needs to be taken into account in many respects regarding Russia’s diplomatic interests.

This research agency thinks that great powers often play diplomatic games on many levels, and sometimes these levels overlap on specific issues or areas. On the issue of the South China Sea, Russia’s foreign policy is deployed on two levels that overlap: at the global level, Russia wants to balance its forces against the monopoly status, and at the regional level “a zoning policy” to protect interests.

At the global level, based on current power relations and perceptions of major threats, as a country seeking a balance of power system in the world which is now dominated by the United States, Russia challenges the uniquely American leadership in several ways, as demonstrated in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. This balance of influence has brought Russia closer to China, as Russia wants to challenge American dominance.

Thus, Russia’s and China’s assessment of external threats coincide in that they view US policies as threatening to them – the development of NATO to the east in the case of Russia, and the strategic rotation axis to Asia of America with China.

The pressure from American world leadership, plus Russia and China’s counterbalance, pushed the two countries closer. From this standpoint, the South China Sea issue for Russia is part of a larger global game.

The second level is regional, stemming from national and regional goals: Moscow wants to diversify relations and avoid instability that could harm Russia’s economic interests.

In terms of trade, Russia wants to benefit from energy contracts, infrastructure and weapons. By strengthening cooperation with Hanoi, including cooperation in military technology, arms exports, joint ventures in energy projects, Moscow created a balance of forces and interests in the South China Sea. At the same time, it has diversified its partnership with Asian countries, with Vietnam being the gateway into the ASEAN community.

This explains why Russia is sympathetic to Vietnam’s concerns in the South China Sea. The overlap between the two levels has made Russia’s East Sea policy difficult to understand.

According to Oilprice, the main consequence of the «two levels» game is that, for Russia itself the issue of the South China Sea, as well as Russia’s response policy, is a variable rather than a constant: Moving from the sovereignty issue in the region to the confrontation of the US-China, Russia’s behavior is more balanced. In contrast, if the United States is less engaged, the more Russia’s policy moves away from the level of global balance of power and more regional zoning factors.

So far, the two levels mentioned in Russia’s South China Sea policy in the South China Sea are still operating well, not in conflict.

Oilprice commented that Vietnam had benefited from the cooperation with Russia. Unlike relations with the United States, the partnership with Russia allows Vietnam access to advanced weapons technology, energy, and avoid being trapped in US-China confrontation. Moreover, Vietnam has a lot of experience in using Russian weapons and equipment.

Oilprice said Russia’s policy was not too offensive to its giant neighbor. Russia-Vietnam strategic partnership with military elements is better than the prospect of strengthened Hanoi-Washington relations.

(Russia’s anti-shipping missile Bastion bought by Russia

Battleship Dinh Tien Hoang Gepard class of the Vietnamese navy)

Although neighbors are not satisfied with Russia’s arms transfers to Vietnam, if the transfer is to decline or stop, it will force Vietnam to change its policy of diversifying its current military relationship to favor Washington. Consequently, observers say that while insisting on the internationalization of the South China Sea dispute, Beijing has accepted Russian involvement as well as Russia-Vietnam cooperation, Oilprice said.

On the Russian side, while maintaining good relations with both China and Vietnam, Moscow is implementing its regional and global goals: increasing Russia’s influence in the Asian balance of power, and reshaping the South China Sea dispute in oder to give Moscow more room for multilateral negotiations, concluded Oilprice./.

(EA)

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